Topic: Professions & Institutions
Legal But Unethical: The Case of the Favorite Judge
case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., et al. places
before the U. S. Supreme Court the deceptively tricky question of whether
an elected judges failure to recuse himself from a case in which he received
substantial campaign donations from one of the parties violates the Due
Process rights of the other party. In other words, does this situation,
as matter of law, infringe the right of the other party to a fair hearing
and impartial adjudication of the dispute? The case is legally challenging
because it questions the traditional presumption of judicial independence.
The court system trusts judges to make their own decisions about whether
they can be impartial in a particular case, because, well
because they are
judges. After all, if you cant trust the judgement of a judge,
whose judgement can you trust? Unless a judge has a direct financial
interest in the outcome of a case he or she is presiding over, therefore,
his or her decision to recuse is voluntary. The judge decides if the judge
can be impartial.
But as with most Supreme Court cases, Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. has an extreme set of facts. Extreme
facts often do not fit established precedent or guidelines, and worse,
when they become the basis for changes in the law, the result are often
laws that work better for the extreme cases than for the common ones.
That is the meaning of the old lawyers saying (and Ive heard old lawyers
say it!), Hard cases make bad law.
The extreme facts in this case can be summarized
easily. Don Blankenship is CEO of a coal company that was hit with a $50
million damages verdict in a West Virginia court. He was determined to
appeal, but before he did, he sunk an unprecedented three million dollars
into the political campaign of one of the judges running for a seat (occupied
by a judge who Blankenship did not like) on the West Virginia Supreme
Court. Since the amount his PAC spent to elect Justice Brent Benjamin
was more than what was spent by all the other candidates combined, it
was no surprise that Benjamin won over Blankenships nemesis.
Hugh Caperton, whose coal company was fighting
to keep its $50 million dollar verdict by opposing Blankenship in the
appeal, was surprised, however. He was stunned, in fact, to see
that Benjamin was one of five judges who would rule on the case.
If you had an important case coming up and
your opponent gave $3 million to elect the judge who was going to decide
it, asks Capertons attorney, would you think that was fair?
In a word, no.
Sure enough, Blankenship won his appeal over
Capertons company, with the judge he helped elect casting the deciding
vote in a 3-2 decision. We dont know whether Benjamin was more inclined
to see the case Blankenships way because he owed his election to Blankenships
support. Current law presumes that Benjamin was able to judge the case
fairly. (Sir Thomas More, as a judge, famously accepted a gift that he
knew was a bribe, and then ruled against the giver—he also gave away
the gift—as a demonstration of his integrity.) But it certainly looked
like the fix was in when Benjamin participated in giving his benefactor
the result he was seeking. That is why, no matter how close the legal
issue may be, the ethical verdict is obvious. It was unethical for Benjamin
not to recuse.
Here is a section from the first Canon of
the American Bar Associations Model Judicial Code:
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved .
Now here is an excerpt from the second Canon, which is entitled, A Judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the Judges activities
A judge shall
act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary
A judge shall not allow family, social, political or
other relationships to influence the judges judicial conduct or judgment.
A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the
private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence the judge.
Read together, these two sections leave little
doubt that Benjamin created an appearance of impropriety that did not
preserve the integrity of the judiciary, but rather called it into question.
Legalistic nit-picking can not argue away such an obvious apparent conflict.
the definition of a financial interest does not include situations
where the benefits to the judge have already been received. True
money was not given with an explicit quid pro quo. But none of
that matters in the real world. It looks like a pay-off.
Today American are looking for institutions
and individuals to trust, and finding only greed, dishonesty and incompetence.
This is no time for a judge to say, Trust me; I know it looks and smells
like a conflict of interest, but really, I can rise above it and be fair
and impartial. It may be legal, but its still wrong.